The concentration of artillery around Ukraine could enable a violent barrage of Ukraine without BTGs even having to roll onto Ukrainian soil. In the 2014-2015 fighting in Ukraine, Russian artillery proved particularly deadly and responsive thanks to drone artillery spotters and effective electronic warfare. While artillery fires are viewed as enablers for decisive action by maneuver forces in Western military theory, Russian doctrine sees artillery as the primary tool for destroying enemy forces, with the maneuver elements then mopping up the survivors. These powerful fire support assets can rain devastation on targets dozens of (or for the Iskander, over 300) miles away. However, BTGs lack the mass to defend broader areas or engage in a prolonged battle of attrition or assaults, particularly in urban operations which tend to be personnel intensive, and rely on lower-quality allied forces (proxies, irregulars, conscripts, reservists, etc.) to defend flanks, screen against attackers, and secure newly captured areas.īesides BTGs, Russia has massed brigades of long-range howitzers, BM-27 and BM-31 multiple rocket launchers, and Iskander ballistic missiles. A BTG’s surveillance assets can effectively monitor a distant point to direct lethal artillery strikes, but don’t provide broader defensive surveillance capacity. In general, BTG are effective at rapidly concentrating combat power at a specific point on the frontline, clobbering local opposition at arm’s length with their outsized downrange firepower, and exploiting the rupture with maneuver units. Army study sought to identify the strengths and weaknesses of BTGs. This gives BTGs a broad toolkit of capabilities at hand to deal with tactical problems without needing to request support from higher headquarters.Ī U.S. T-72B3 – Image Credit: Vitaly Kuzmin/Creative Commons.īoth types of BTGs are reinforced by two or three batteries of mobile rocket artillery and/or self-propelled howitzers (122- and 152-millimeter caliber), for a total 12-18 artillery systems-an enormous amount of fire support for a battalion-sized unit.įurthermore, a BTG may integrate one or two mobile surface-to-air missile batteries an anti-tank company equipped with long-range anti-tank guided missiles and supporting combat engineer, electronic warfare and reconnaissance platoons. 10 article.įundamentally, the buildup involves the transfer of individual BTGs and artillery units from three out-of-region armies to mass in three sectors adjacent to Ukraine. In fact, commercial satellite imagery and traffic videos posted on social media, had already begun to reveal the ominous troop movements weeks earlier, as discussed in this Nov. intelligence concluded Russia was massing up to 175,000 troops around Ukraine-with analysts estimating 50 going on 100 BTGs mustering for a potential fight. Seven years later on Decemthe Washington Post reported U.S. Supported by electronic warfare companies and cross-border artillery fire from Russia, the Russian BTGs dealt Ukraine’s hard-pressed ground forces brutal setbacks in the battles of Ilovaisk and Debaltseve, and the sieges of Luhansk and Donetsk airport. When columns of Russian armored vehicles poured into Ukraine in August 2014, they were organized into eight Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), ad-hoc formations built around regular tank or mechanized infantry battalions, but reinforced with powerful artillery and support units.
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